Posted on 01 March 2010.
By Daniel R. Hawes
An old Greek fable famously tells the story of a fox, who tries really hard to get his hands on a tasty vine of grapes. The fox tries and he tries, but eventually fails in all of his attempts to acquire the grapes; at which point the fox calmly continues with his life by convincing himself that he really didn’t want those grapes that badly after all…
Although there is a common wisdom in this tale of how we deal with being thwarted in our desires, a more modern psychological account of the fox’s tale may look a little different:
I.e. if the fox in our tale had been reading today’s psychological journals he may have concluded, more precisely, that had he continued in his efforts, and finally obtained the grapes, THEN he may not have liked them as much.
To see why the fox may have concluded this, we must first consider, that from a physiological (and pharmacological) perspective wanting something, and liking something do not necessarily go hand-in-hand, and that they certainly aren’t the same thing. For example, a drug addict really, really wants her fix, but many addicts genuinely report not particularly liking their subsequent drugged out experiences. Additionally, a number of psychological studies show that liking and wanting can be independently manipulated, and that often times both operate at a subconscious level. In a more medical sense, scientists such as Uzma Khan and Baba Shiv from Stanford University, therefore support the notion that
“liking is mediated by opioid systems and primary sensory and valuation regions, whereas wanting is encoded by midbrain dopamine activity in efferent regions such as nucleus accumbens”.
These two psychologists, also now have been able to show – by a series of wittily designed experiments – that wanting and liking can not only be independently manipulated, but that single events can drive both feelings in opposite directions. In particular, one of their studies was featured in the journal Psychological Science this month, as showing how the event of being thwarted in one’s attempt to acquire an object can increase one’s “want” for the object, while simultaneously decreasing one’s “liking”.
The study design is fairly intricate, so I’ll have to spend a little time explaining:
The experimenters began by separating their participants into two experimental conditions; one which they call the jilted condition, one which is then simply the non-jilted condition. Both groups were essentially evaluated for their liking and wanting for a particular object – a $5 gift card for Circuit City – in comparison to two other, similar objects (a $5 gift card for Best Buy and a $5 gift card for Target). As far as the participants were concerned, they believed that they were playing computer games for virtual tokens, which may later be exchanged for the Circuit City gift card.
The non-jilted condition was initiated by participants stating their willingness to pay (in tokens) for both the Best Buy and the Circuit City gift card, and then followed by a computer game involving anagram tasks. As a prize – supposedly for having performed well in the anagram game – all participants in the non-jilted condition were awarded the Circuit City gift card, and then asked to play yet a second game in which they were given the chance to win some additional tokens. After finishing the second game, all participants in the non-jilted condition were given the choice additional option of exchanging the Circuit City gift card they had supposedly won, against the Target gift card; thus concluding the experiment.
The jilted condition, in comparison, began with participants stating their willingness to pay only for the Best Buy gift card, and then continuing immediately to the first anagram game. Unlike their counterparts in the non-jilted condition, the participants in the jilted condition were not awarded the Circuit City gift card after playing the first game, but instead were informed that their performance in the game had been insufficient to warrant this prize. After having been given this information of having failed to win the Circuit City gift card, the participants were then asked to indicate their willingness to pay for the Circuit City gift card. After having indicated this second willingness to pay measure, participants in the jilted condition also played a second anagram game, after which they were rewarded tokens, but also the Circuit City gift card which they had been denied after the first anagram game. Finally, participants in the jilted condition were also given the option of exchanging their Circuit City gift card against the Target gift card.
To summarize, both groups indicated how much they wanted the Circuit City gift card by expressing their willingness to pay for it. However, the jilted group indicated their wanting AFTER having failed to win the object, while the non-jilted group indicated their wanting even before having attempted to win the object.
As the first graph below shows, having been thwarted in the attempt to acquire the prize clearly increased participant’s “Want” for the Circuit City gift card. The jilted group ended up wanting the gift car much more than their counter parts in the non-jilted group.
However, after both games had been played – when all participants had been awarded the same amount of tokens and exactly one Circuit City gift card – and all participants were given the option of exchanging their Circuit City card for the Target card, the jilted condition ended up making use of this option far more frequently than did the members of the non-jilted group. It seems then, that the participants in the jilted group ended up liking their Circuit City card much less than those in the non-jilted group.
In particular, this finding is astonishing, since the decreased “liking” was displayed exactly by those participants who had reported greater “wanting” for the particular gift card. The same event – having failed to win the card in the first attempt – had simultaneously affected participant’s wanting and liking for the gift card in opposite directions.
It should be stated, that although this is a clear example of the decoupling of wanting and liking, it does not at all mean, that both feelings must always go in opposite directions. As the author’s state
“Although we propose that jilting can induce wanting-liking disjunctions, we are not arguing that such decoupling occurs unfailingly, across individuals and situations; wanting and liking are dissociable, but certainly not disconnected.”
The original report includes a second study, which investigates further the way felt emotional intensity moderates the disjunction between liking and wanting. I might post a brief post about this later this week, but in summary the second study finds that the
“disjunctions between these [wanting and liking] are more common and pronounced among individuals lower in felt emotional intensity. These “cool-headed” individuals would thus be those most prone to perversely desiring more what they like less.”
At the end of all of this, I guess, stands the all-too-human experience that very often we want something especially because it seems so hard to obtain, but then once we do obtain it the thing just doesn’t seem right for us…
Main Reference:
Litt, A. (2010-01-01) Lusting While Loathing: Parallel Counterdriving of Wanting and Liking. Psychological Science, 21(1), 118-125. DOI: 10.1177/0956797609355633
Source URL: http://www.psychologytoday.com/node/38690